andrew@theinternet

NetSec Lecture Notes - Lesson 3 - Cybercrimes

Cybercrimes

Actors in the Underground

  • Exploit developers
    • very smart people who reverse-engineer software
    • develop and sell exploit packs and kits
  • Botnet masters
    • Develop software and control vast numbers of zombie machines
    • Rent out their botnet to other actors
  • Spammers
    • Advertise links for other actors
  • Phishers
    • Setup scam sites to steal information
    • Work with spammers to spread the attack
  • Counterfeiters
    • Run websites selling fake goods
    • Must be able to clear credit cards
  • Bulletproof Hosting Provides
    • Offer dedicated servers to other actors
    • Hosted in lawless parts of the internet
  • Carders, Cashiers, and Mules
    • Turn stolen bank accounts and credit cards into cash
  • Crowdturfers
    • Create, verify, and manage fake accounts
    • Solve CAPTCHAS for a fee

Structure of the Underground

  • Pay-per-install and Exploit-as-a-service –> Botnets {Credit Card and Bank Account Theft DDoS and Ransomware Extortion Click Fraud and Ad Injection Spam Bitcoin Mining}
    • Spam can facilitate Phishing, Counterfeit Goods, and Malware Attachments
    • Credit Card and Bank Account Theft can facilitate Carders and Cashiers
  • The general point is that bad actors form an interconnected ecosystem

Underground Forums

  • One of the entry points into the ecosystem
  • Today, underground forums are ubiquitous
    • Many operate in plain site; they’re just a Google search away
    • Large volume of illicit goods and services are available
  • Law enforcement often targets forums/IRC rooms
    • In some cases, forums have been law enforcement sting operations
  • Black market forums are hugely valuable for security professionals
    • Give researchers a view into the underworld
    • Allow white-hats to observe trends and detect unfolding attacks
  • Forums are populated by buyers, sellers, and rippers
    • Administrators verify trustworthy buyers
    • Rippers steal from naive buyers or sell fraudulent goods
    • Some participants ask for goods or services

Exploits-as-a-Service: Decoupling and Specialization

  • In the old days, compromise and monetization were coupled
    • Criminals would develop exploits, use them to launch attacks, and then use the hacked machines to make money
  • Monetization and Compromise are decoupled
    • Exploit developers sell exploit kits or packs
    • Other actors leverage the kits to attack hosts
    • Often via spam and/or compromised web servers
    • Compromised hosts are then sold on the black market

Pay-per-install model of malware

  • A malware distribution model
    • Relies on drive-by-download attacks against browsers
    • Blackhole, MPack, and other exploit kits
  • Two styles of attacks
    • A bad actor can buy an exploit kit and deploy it themselves
      • Bad actor must figure out distribution themselves. Need infrastructure.
    • A bad actor can rent access to an exploit server that hosts that kit
      • Azure metasploit, lol
  • Bad actors are responsible for acquiring traffic
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Dark Web Quiz

  • Readily available to the public, and searchable with standard search engines
    • Surface web
    • While this is what we’re typically referring to when we talk about “the internet”, it really makes up only about 4% of the WWW content. About 96% is deep web
  • It is not indexed by standard search engines
    • Deep web
  • Web content that exists on darknets
    • Dark web

PPI Quiz

  • A program that hides malicious code from anti-virus software
    • Crypters
  • Software that allows an attacker to update or install malware on a victim’s computer
    • Trojan Download Manager
  • It increases traffic to the attacker’s site by manipulating search engines
    • Blackhat Search Engine Optimizer
  • A webpage that lists many keywords, in hopes of increasing search engine ranking. Scripts on the page redirect to the attackers page
    • Doorway pages

From Malware to Botnets

  • Infected machines have many other valuable resources
    • Unique IP addresses and bandwidth
    • Spare CPU cycles
  • Botnets allow criminals to aggregate and control infected machines
    • Command and Control (C&C, C2) infrastructure for controlling bots
    • Swaths of bots are often rented out to other actors for various purposes

Command and Control: IRC Channels

  • The key to a botnet’s success is efficient and robust C2
  • This is not always easy
  • Simplest and most efficient approach is through centralized control
    • img
    • Problem: single point of failure
    • Easy to locate and take down
  • A more robust approach is to use a peer-to-peer network
    • img
    • The drawback is that the botmaster does not have direct control over, or communication with, all the bots
      • In fact, the botmaster may not know how many bots even get the commands, or when
  • A more modern Approach is Fast Flux DNS
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    • All bots connect to a C2 website
    • Website can map to whatever IP address, easy to post up wherever. This defeats IP-address-based blocking
    • However, domain name can still be detected and blocked
  • Most modern approach is Random Domain Generation
    • Takes Fast Flux DNS approach, but generataes random domain names using same algorithm and seed between bot and botmaster
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Spam Quiz

  • What are the two defining characteristics of spam?
    • Inappropriate or irrelevant to the user
    • Large number of recipients

Spam

  • It is estimated that >90% of all email sent each day is spam
    • This translates into hundreds of billions of spam messages per day
  • Spammers are key players in the cybercrime underground
    • Build, curate, buy, and sell lists of email addresses
    • Send mail on behalf of other actors for a fee
      • Traffic-PPI services looking to acquire traffic and infections
      • Phishers looking to steal personal information
  • Spammers rent access to botnets to send bulk email
    • Need a large number of IP addresses to circumvent spam filters

Spam Affiliate Marketing

  • Huge amounts of spam are related to affiliate marketing schemes
    • Scammers set up websites selling counterfeit goods
  • Scammers are responsible for delivering products and collecting payments
    • Access to credit card processing infrastructure is crucial
    • Many scams have legitimate customer service departments!
  • Spammers sign up as “affiliates” with scam campaigns
    • Spammers advertise the scams, and collect commision on successful sales
    • Commission is typically 30-50% of the final sale price

Spam Conversion

  • The conversion rate is the percent of spam messages that result in a final sale
  • Big questions
    • Why do spammers continue to send spam?
    • How many messages get past spam filters?
    • How much money does each successful transaction make?
  • Measurement technique – infiltrate the spam generation/monetizing process and find out answers

Spam Filter Effectiveness

  • A case study (Storm botnet)
    • What percentage of spam got through the filters?
    • img
    • Average: 0.014% – 1 in 7,142 attempted spams got through
    • img
    • img
      • Conversion rates (on messages that made it to inbox):
        • Pharmacy = 1 in 1,737
        • Postcard = 1 in 37
        • April Fool = 1 in 25
      • Revenue from pharmacy:
        • Extrapolates to $9,500/day (and 8,500 new bot infections per day), or $3.5million per year
        • This is split between the affiliate program and the Storm operators (60/40 split)

Spam Revenue Quiz

  • Name the top three countries where spam directed visitors added items to their shopping cart.
    • USA
    • Canada
    • Philippines
  • img

Scamming Ain’t Easy

  • The scamming ecosystem
    • Network infrastructure and the key role of payment processors
  • What sort of hosting infra do you need to run such a scam?

Infra

  • Domain Name (s)
    • Problem - Legit registrars will take down your name if they receive complaints
    • Solution - Some registrars are known to ignore complaints, but they carge more.
  • DNS Servers
    • Problem - DNS Servers are an obvious choke-point for Law Enforcement
    • Solution - “Bulletproof” DNS is available on the market, but its expensive
  • Web Servers
    • Problem - Web servers are an obvious choke-pointg for Law Enforcement
    • Solution - “Bulletproof” servers are available, but they’re expensive
  • Some services offer resilient hosting with distributed web servers, domain randomization, and DNS fast-flux
    • But obviously, it’s expensive!

Payments

  • To sell products, you need to be able to accept payments
  • You’ll need:
    • Merchant bank account to deposit your payments
    • Relationship with a payment processing service
      • Handles credit card payments
      • Withdraws money from the buyers account via a card association network (e.g. Visa)
  • Downfall: most banks and processors won’t do business with scammers
  • Solution: Again, go to “bulletproof” vendors and eat expensive fees